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WHO MAY DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE FEDERAL JUDGES?
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
PETER M. SHANE-
The United States Constitution provides that federal judges shall
"hold their Offices during good Behaviour," and shall receive a
Compensation "which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."' These few words and, by common understanding,
the Impeachment Clauses,2 represent the sole constitutional text
explicitly addressing issues ofjudicial tenure, compensation, discipline,
and removal. This elliptical prose has provoked fervent debate for two
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1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. By convention, these clauses are known as theJudicial
Tenure and Salary Protection Clauses, respectively.
2 Article II, § 4, of the Constitution states that "The President, Vice President and
all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
Id. art. II, § 4. The Constitution vests "the sole Power of Impeachment" in the House
of Representatives. Id. art. I, § 2, d. 5. This process, which produces articles of
impeachment resembling an indictment, triggers the "sole Power" of the Senate to
"try all Impeachments." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
The Constitution's express procedural requirements for Senate impeachment
trials are sparse: Senators "sitting for that Purpose" must be "on Oath or Affirma-
tion"; the ChiefJustice of the United States shall preside over the impeachment trial
of a President; and conviction requires "the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present." Id. Impeachment trials are expressly exempted from the
Constitution's jury requirements. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
Should an impeachment trial result in a conviction, "[j]udgment ... shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and
Punishment, according to Law." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. As interpreted by the Senate,
this provision requires removal from office as an automatic consequence of
conviction, but disqualification from office requires a separate vote. See SENATE
COMM. ON RULES & ADMiN., PROCEDURE AND GuimLm FOR IMPEACHMENT TRIALS
IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. No. 33, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 95, 99, 101
(1986) [hereinafter PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES]. The President's pardon power does
not extend to impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c. 1.
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centuries, and this Article addresses the two issues perhaps most
fundamental to the continuing controversy: First, is impeachment the
sole permissible mechanism for judicial removal? Second, who, if
anyone, is authorized to discipline federal judges through sanctions
other than removal?
These questions are necessarily anxious ones. Because courts rarely
address the legal issues related to impeachment,3 and because
centuries of debate have evoked no consensus on certain key points,
4
the two issues seem to defy authoritative resolution through the usual
processes of constitutional law making. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
recent decision to treat as nonjusticiable any claims regarding the
procedural sufficiency of Senate judicial impeachment trials only
buttresses this conclusion.
5
No feature of our public institutional life, however, is likely more
essential to preserving a government of laws than an honorable and
independent judiciary. Except perhaps for concerns surrounding the
judicial nomination and confirmation processes, no issues pertain more
directly to the quality ofjudicial integrity and independence than those
ofjudicial tenure, compensation, discipline, and removal. To confront
3 For example, the Supreme Court has held that challenges to the constitutional
sufficiency ofSenate impeachment trial procedures present a nonjusticiable political
question. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735-40 (1993). In addition,
lower courts have held that impeachment proceedings need not precede criminal
proceedings against a public officer subject to impeachment. See United States v.
Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir.) (holding that an active federal judge may
be criminally prosecuted), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Hastings,
681 F.2d 706, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974). And, finally, one court has held that an impeachment based substantially
on allegations that resulted in an acquittal in a prior criminal prosecution does not
amount to double jeopardy. See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 500
(D.D.C. 1992), vacated and remanded, 1993 WL 81273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 1993),
dismissed, 1993 WL 439810, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993).
4 Scholarly debate persists, for example, on the questions whether impeachable
offenses are properly limited to statutory crimes, compare IRVING BRANT, IMPEACH-
MENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 8 (1972) (affirmative) with RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 79 (1973) (negative); whether impeachment
convictions are judicially reviewable, compare BRANT, supra, at 182-97 and BERGER,
supra, at 121 (affirmative) with CHARLES L. BLACKJR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK
53-63 (1974) (negative); and-most relevant to this Article-whether impeachment is
the sole constitutionally permissible means for removing Article IIIjudges, compare
Martha A. Ziskind,Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American
Precedents, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 135, 152-53 (affirmative) with BERGER, supra, at 122-80
(neeaCtive).
See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 732.
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these questions is thus to face problems resistant to definitive
resolution, but essential to "get right."
As one surveys the sizeable literature in this area, it is hard to avoid
making two observations. First, reaching definitive judgments on at
least some key issues from the plain meaning of the Constitution's text,
or from a narrow version of constitutional originalism, is virtually
impossible. The text is open to multiple interpretations, and the data
relevant to unearthing the drafters' intent are sometimes not focused
on the points most pertinent to current deliberations. Second, the
methodological premises of some proffered analyses are insufficiently
examined. Although the views of the founders are relatively clear as
to the questions they actually debated, how one should regard the
issues the founders did not discuss is not obvious. For example, when
calculating the implications of the entire Constitution on impeachment-
related issues that the founders did not consider, no compelling reason
exists to focus exclusively on their specific views regarding impeach-
ment. If the objective is a constitutional interpretation that makes
sense of the whole document, then considering those values and
policies signaled by other parts of the Constitution that distribute
governmental power, in addition to the Impeachment Clauses, makes
more sense.
This Article argues that "strict originalism," that is, attempts to
discern the Constitution's resolution of particular issues according to
the founders' expectations regarding those very issues, makes sense
with respect to what I term political mechanisms for judicial discipline
and removal. By political mechanisms, I mean those removal methods
that can be fully initiated and fully implemented by the elected (or
"political") branches of the federal government without the involve-
ment of the judiciary.6 As discussed later, history provides clear
evidence that impeachment was to be the sole political mechanism for
disciplining federal judges.
Pursuing a narrow originalist assessment of judiciay-dependent
mechanisms for judicial discipline, that is, methods that the elected
branches cannot fully execute because the judiciary itself must play an
important role in their implementation, makes far less sense. This
6 1 am thus using "political" in the same sense in which the Supreme Court
employs the word to designate "political questions." See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (defining the term as questions "not justidable primarily
because of the separation ofpowers within the Federal Government"). I do not mean
to imply that political mechanisms are ungoverned by law, only that the relevant legal
decisions are made entirely by the elected branches of government.
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conclusion is especially compelling with regard to disciplining federal
judges not sitting on the Supreme Court. For example, judiciary-
dependent methods of judicial discipline include both criminal
prosecution, which requires ajudicial trial, and judicial self-regulation,
as under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980. 7 Notably, the founders did not deliberate
seriously upon the use of such judiciary-dependent mechanisms, and
the Constitution was not drafted in reaction to any popular assessment
of their virtues or vices.
As to judiciary-dependent mechanisms of judicial discipline, it is
sounder to attempt what Professor Geoffrey Miller has elsewhere called
"neoclassical" constitutional interpretation.8 Such interpretation is not
rooted in highly specific original understandings of particular
questions, but rather in more general values revealed in the founders'
debates about the Constitution as a whole, including its general scheme
for the distribution of government power. The conclusions drawn in
this Article by employing such an analysis are: (1) that federal judges
may be disciplined through judicially enforceable civil and criminal
sanctions imposed through executive or independent counsel prosecu-
tion, and (2) that the federal judiciary, subject to congressional
regulation, may exercise powers of self-regulation forjudges not sitting
on the Supreme Court.
As scholars have noted, the existence of authority to devise
mechanisms other than impeachment for judicial discipline does not
itself prove that instituting those other mechanisms is desirable.f The
existence of such authority does help, however, to legitimate those
judicial discipline mechanisms currently employed, and to promote the
debate concerning whether those or other procedures are necessary,
or indeed, sufficient.
7 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036-40 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
8 Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 52-58.
9 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its
Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 103 (1989). For example, even if judicial self-
regulation is a permissible source of discipline, cumbersome procedures could drain
judicial resources and outweigh any intended benefit, or substantive standards could
encroach on the desired independence of the judiciary. For the conclusions of the
National Commission on judicial Discipline and Removal regarding the prudence of
the various proposals it considered, see NATIONAL COMM'N ONJUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
& REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
REMOVAL (1993).
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I. WHAT THE FOUNDERS RESOLVED: IMPEACHMENT
AS THE EXCLUSIVE POLITICAL MECHANISM
FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
A. Confronting Constitutional Ambiguity
The Constitution yields no "plain meaning" with respect to our
understanding of the conditions concerningjudicial tenure, discipline,
and removal. In fact, the Constitution makes no express reference to
the removal ofjudges. Yet, the Philadelphia Convention assumed, and
our government has acted from its earliest days as if, the "civil officers"
subject to impeachment under Article II include judges.1 0 So inter-
preted, the Impeachment Clauses render judges removable for
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."1 1 This
Article II text raises the obvious question whether misconduct of a
lesser variety might violate the "good Behaviour" standard of Article III
and thus subject a judge to removal, or at least discipline, through
some other process. The question arises because the Article III
formula could sensibly be read either as setting a substantive standard
of conduct on which judicial tenure is contingent, 2 or as employing
an eighteenth-century term of art signaling that federal judges shall
hold life tenure unless impeached.' 3
Additional uncertainty arises because the Constitution confers on
federal courts "[t]he judicial Power of the United States," 14 yet
authorizes Congress to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution ... all ... Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."15 Thus, if a judge is a "civil officer"
within the meaning of the Impeachment Clauses, then a judge would
seem likewise to be an "officer" of the "Government of the United
States," whose powers Congress may regulate. These clauses, there-
10 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966) [hereinafter THE RECORDS] ("It had been said that the Judiciary would be
impeachable."); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No. 79] ((Judges] are liable to be
impeached... by the House of Representatives.. . ."). In 1803,John Pickering was
the first federal judge impeached. Twelvejudicial impeachments have followed since.
See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 10 n.29.
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
12 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 122-81.
13 See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 65-67.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
15 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
/
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fore, plausibly could either confer judicial disciplinary power directly
to the judiciary or empower Congress to determine that the exercise of
judicial self-regulation is "necessary and proper" for executing judicial
authority.
Because the text is ambiguous, commentators have turned to
historical data in search of the drafters' understanding of their own
handiwork. In spite of the intense modern debate on interpretive
method in constitutional adjudication, relatively formalist arguments
hold a special attraction with respect to issues concerning the
allocation of government power.16 By "formalist arguments," I mean
those arguments derived from purportedly straightforward understand-
ings of a limited range of authoritative materials, such as the constitu-
tional text, the ratification debates, and the records of the First
Congress. Such arguments are appealing because functionalist debates
over government structure are often notably open-ended, and because
allowing conspicuous creativity in interpreting the words that prescribe
the government's checking and balancing mechanisms would seem at
odds with the Constitution's central premise concerning government's
structure-namely, that checks and balances are firmly established to
preserve our government as one of limited powers.
In resorting to history, however, one should not wish into being
information that does not exist. As one commentator has aptly written:
"[T]he founders thought, argued, reached decisions, and wrote about
the issues that mattered to them, not about our contemporary
problems."' 7 Among the implications of this insight is the impor-
tance of not imagining originalist answers to contemporary problems
that the founders simply did not address.1 8 With respect to judicial
16 See generally Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate
Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821 (1985) (arguing
that narrow originalist interpretation of "fairly determinate clauses delineating
government structure" may buttress legitimacy ofjudiciary's more open-minded
interpretation of fundamental rights clauses); Peter M. Shane, Conventionalism in
Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
573 (1987) (urging that conventional textualist interpretation of Articles I and II of
the Constitution, where possible, is likely to further the Constitution's specific
normative purposes and to fulfill more generally "our aspirations for control and
accountability as a part ofjustice").
17 H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987).
18 In a skillful defense of originalism as a workable approach to constitutional
interpretation, Professor Richard Kay has expressed the view that the Constitution
leaves no question unanswered because the permissibility of any truly new and
unanticipated practice can be resolved through a set of presumptions. In particular,
because the national government is a government of limited powers, he posits that
"[a]ny truly new thing done by the federal government is unauthorized and therefore
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discipline, history can be helpful only to the extent that the convention-
al late-eighteenth century meaning of the relevant constitutional
phrases resolves our current puzzles, or to the extent that those voting
to propose and ratify the Constitution contemplated the specific
questions we currently address to the Impeachment Clauses-and
moreover-had achieved consensus as to the proper answers. From this
perspective, the major implication of the relevant clauses for judicial
susceptibility to political removals seems overwhelmingly dear:
Impeachment is the only mechanism with which the elected branches
are empowered to remove federal judges without relying on the courts
themselves.
1 9
B. Historical Rejection of Removal Mechanisms
Other Than Impeachment
Prior to the Convention of 1787, Americans were familiar with
three models of judicial accountability to political authority. These
were systems by which judges could be removed (1) by the Executive
at will,20 (2) by the Executive upon "address" from the legislature,
21
void." Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication:
Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 256 (1988). By contrast, the
states do not owe their existence to the Constitution, which promises to leave to the
states all powers not prohibited or reserved to the national government. See U.S.
CONST. amend. X. Thus, "[a]ny truly new thing done by a state must be outside of
those prohibitions, and must, therefore, be constitutional." Kay, supra, at 256.
It maybe that, because there is some broadly relevant (but not narrowly focused)
historical material against which to assess the permissibility of all the disciplinary
options discussed in this Article, none would qualify as a "truly new thing" within
Professor Kay's interpretive framework. Id. However, to the extent some options for
judicial discipline may "fall outside the categories established by the constitution-
makers," id. at 255, Professor Kay's interpretive axioms will not help in their
resolution. That is, whether or not his interpretive premises can be used persuasively
to adjudicate all unanticipated forms of government action directly affecting private
parties, they do not directly help in interpreting separation of powers controversies
within the national government. No doubt exists that the national government may
discipline and remove its judges; that power is authorized. Professor Kay's premises
though do not help to address which branch is permitted to exercise the authorities
of the national government, and in which form.
19 In rejecting as nonjusticiable an impeached judge's procedural challenges to his
Senate trial and conviction, the Supreme Court recently stated: "In our constitutional
system, impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the
Legislature." Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 738 (1993). It would be more
accurate, or at least less controversial, to describe impeachment as the only check on
the misconduct of individual judges. Other congressional powers regarding the
structure, jurisdiction, and spending of the federal courts might be considered
legitimate institutional checks on the judicial branch.
20 Such, of course, was the English system prior to the Glorious Revolution, and
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or (3) by legislative bodies through impeachment. 22 The susceptibility
ofjudges to at-will discharge by the Stuart Monarchs had been a major
grievance among the English throughout the seventeenth century,
except during the Commonwealth period.25 The ability of the Crown
to remove colonial judges at its pleasure was likewise a grievance of the
colonists, 24 and was expressly deplored in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. 25 Because the abuses of royal prerogative concerning judges
represented the primary backdrop against which the founders crafted
a new system of judicial tenure, it is not surprising that the constitu-
tional standard forjudicial tenure during "good Behaviour" is identical
to the standard embodied in the 1700 Act of Settlement.2 6 The
"good Behaviour" standard was adopted by that Act precisely to redress
the precariousness ofjudicial tenure evident during the Stuart period.
The second political mechanism for judicial removal-legislative
address to the Executive-was expressly contemplated and rejected
during the Constitutional Convention. On August 27, Delaware'sJohn
Dickinson proposed that judges be removable by "'the Executive on the
application [of] the Senate and House of Representatives.'" 2 7 After
brief debate, the motion failed by a vote of one in favor, three absent,
and seven opposed. Gouvernor Morris, John Rutledge, and Edmund
Randolph explicitly opposed the motion as inconsistent with the
intended independence of the judiciary.
28
the situation of colonial judges in British North America. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 160 (1969); FrankJ. Battisti, An
IndependentJudiciay or an Evanescent Dream?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 711, 712 n.2
(1975).
21 SeeJoseph H. Smith, An IndependentJudiciaiy: The Colonial Background, 124 U.
PA. L. REV. 1104, 1113 (1976) (describing attempt by the Pennsylvania Assembly in
the 17 00s to insist that colonial judges be displaced for misbehavior at the request of
the Assembly); id. at 1153-55 (describing address under, inter alia, the Bill of Rights
of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, the Delaware and Maryland Constitutions
of 1776, and the South Carolina Constitution of 1778).
22 On the experience of the states prior to the drafting of the Constitution, see
PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HuLL, IMPEACHMENT iN AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 68-95
(1984).
23 See Battisti, supra note 20, at 712 n.2 (discussing the removal ofjudges by the
King for decisions that were "unfavorable to the Crown"); Smith, supra note 21, at
1105-10 (discussing the frequent removal ofjudges for political reasons).
24 See WOOD, supra note 20, at 159-61.
25 "He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776).
26 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 150.
27 THE RECORDS, supra note 10, at 428.
28 See id. at 428-29.
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This history is plainly significant because contemporary observers
consistently interpreted the text as authorizing impeachment to be the
sole political instrument for effecting judicial removals. In The
Federalist, No. 79, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The precautions for [judges'] responsibility are comprised in
the article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be
impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives and
tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from
office and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only
provision on the point which is consistent with the necessary
independence of the judicial character, and is the only one which
we find in our own Constitution in respect to our own judges.
The want of a provision for removing the judges on account
of inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate
men will be sensible that such a provision would either not be
practiced upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated
to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of
the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts.
An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and
inability would much oftener give scope to personal and party
attachments and enmities than advance the interests ofjustice or
the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must
for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or
express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual
disqualification.
29
Hamilton thus characterizes the Constitution's failure to specify any
method of judicial removal other than impeachment as a deliberate
reflection of the drafters' intentions regarding judicial independence.
He offers a cost-benefit analysis to justify the consequence that the text
will leave the government virtually without remedy in cases ofjudicial
"inability." In the worst cases, he implies discreetly, the inability of
grossly disabled judges will suffice to keep them off the bench. In less
extreme cases, distinguishing the able from the unable "would much
oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities than
advance the interests of justice or the public good."30
The New York Antifederalist essayist Brutus agreed that the "only
causes [for which federal judges could] be displaced [would be]
conviction of treason, bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors."
1
29 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 10, at 474.
3 0 d.
sI Essays of Brutus, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 103,163 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1985).
Brutus's essays appeared in the New York Journal over the same period during which
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He identified impeachment as the sole constitutional avenue for the
removal of federal judges. 32 Naturally, Hamilton and Brutus agreed
on these points, because they both sought to persuade their readers of
the political independence of the judiciary. They differed only as to
whether this independence was virtue ( la Hamilton) or vice ( la
Brutus).
C. Separation of Powers Theory and the
Political Removal ofJudges
Not surprisingly, given the consistency of the historical data,
regarding impeachment as the exclusive political means for judicial
removal is consistent with both the pertinent constitutional text and
other well-recognized aspects of the federal separation of powers. The
logic of this interpretation is evident upon reflecting that impeachment
and conviction entail, by design, a highly deliberative and cumbersome
decision-making process. It seems implausible that the founders
explicitly insisted on so painstaking a mechanism for disciplining
judicial "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,"
yet left it implicitly open to Congress or to the President to remove
federal judges on identical or lesser grounds through unspecified, yet
less cumbersome, devices.
This exclusivity view is also consistent with analogous Supreme
Court interpretations of the separation of powers. The Court has
found impeachment to be the sole mechanism through which Congress
may participate in decisions to remove executive officers.3 3  The
Court concluded that any other direct congressional role in removing
that paper published many of Publius's papers constituting The Federalist. Notably,
the actual authorship of Brutus's essays is a matter of historical dispute. See id. at
103. The description ofjudicial tenure cited here appears at the beginning of an
essay arguing that the Constitution would give the federal judiciary extraordinarily
broad and dangerous powers. See id. at 163. Brutus ultimately contended: "Perhaps
nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of the state
governments than the constitution of the judicial." Id. at 186.
32 Id. at 185. Brutus's statement appears in support of his explanation why the
national judiciary will enjoy extraordinary independence, and his argument that
judges "placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of
heaven itself." Id. at 183.
33 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1986) (finding that officers of the
United States can be removed "only upon impeachment by the House of Representa-
tives and conviction by the Senate"); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 114-15, 170
(1926) (quoting with approval President Coolidge's statement that "[t]he dismissal of
an officer of the Government ... other than by impeachment, is exclusively an
executive function").
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executive officers would generate too active a legislative role in the
supervision of administrators.3 4 That would be the case even though
the decisional powers vested in many of the executive officers who
might be subjected to congressional removal involve matters of policy
on which legislative influence is ordinarily regarded as legitimate.
3 5
Given that the legitimate purview of congressional politics is presum-
ably narrower in adjudication than in executive administration, it is
inconceivable that the Court would permit Congress to play a greater
role in the dismissal of judges than it plays in the supervision of
executive officers.
In the same vein, a judiciary vulnerable to removal at the Execu-
tive's will would have been antithetical even to the nascent ideal of
judicial independence that the Revolutionary generation pursued:
Since the colonists had become convinced that dependence of the
judges on executive caprice was "dangerous to liberty and property
of the subject," their Revolutionary constitutions sought to isolate
the judiciary from any future gubernatorial tampering .... 36
In fact, in over two hundred years, it does not appear that any
commentator has seriously suggested either that unilateral executive
removals of Article III judges are constitutionally permissible, or that
permitting such removals would amount to a constitutional improvement0
3 7
3 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-23 (concluding that such a role is not contemplated
by the Constitution and is "inconsistent with separation of powers").
35 Cf Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to
invalidate EPA rulemaking on grounds of unrecorded ex parte contacts with White
House aides and members of Congress).
36 WOOD, supra note 20, at 160.
37 My impression that no one has interpreted the 1787 constitutional text as
permitting unilateral executive removals of Article IIIjudges is supported chiefly by
an extensive bibliography onjudicial removals compiled for the National Commission
on judicial Discipline and Removal by the FederalJudidal Center. The sources cited
there make no such suggestion. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL HISTORY OFFICE, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN AMERICA: A
PRELIMINARY WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY (1992). Summarizing her detailed review of
the various proposals introduced in Congress since 1789 for constitutional
amendments or legislative reforms relating to judicial tenure, Elizabeth B. Bazan, a
legislative attorney with the American Law Division of the Congressional Research
Service, did not mention any proposal for unilateral presidential removals. The
proposal coming closest would have permitted presidential removal upon address by
both houses of Congress. See Hearing Before the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 236 (1992) (testimony of Elizabeth B.
Bazan). Nor did anyone proffer such a suggestion for the consideration of the
Commission itself. Telephone Interview with Bill Weller, Deputy Executive Director,
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal (July 23, 1993).
The President does enjoy statutory authority to remove adjudicators for cause
from several of the so-called Article I courts. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (Supp. IV 1992)
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The permissibility of political removals through impeachment is,
indeed, so compelling a constitutional conclusion that only one
significant ambiguity truly exists with respect to the authority of the
political branches, acting alone, to discipline federal judges: Does the
exclusivity of impeachment as a political mechanism for removal
prohibit other political disciplinary mechanisms short of removal?
More specifically, does this exclusivity prevent the suspension ofjudges
by joint resolution, upon executive initiative, or upon address by both
houses of Congress to the President?
D. Political Discipline and Judicial Independence
Frequently it is suggested that all politically controlled disciplinary
mechanisms short of impeachment are precluded by implication
because any such mechanisms would undermine the value of judicial
independence that the Judicial Tenure and Salary Protection Clauses
are intended to protect. This independence, it is widely argued, has
two components. The first, a separation of powers component,
involves the judiciary's status as a co-equal branch, free from the
domination of Congress or the Executive.3 8 The second, a due
process-related component, concerns the rights of litigants to impartial
decision-making under the rule of law, free from extraneous interfer-
ence.
The idea that Congress or the Executive could forego the impeach-
ment process and adopt a less cumbersome disciplinary system-
leading, for example, to the temporary suspension of individual
(Court of Military Appeals); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (1988) (Tax Court); 38 U.S.C.
§ 7253(f) (Supp. IV 1992) (Court of Veterans Appeals). The constitutionality of even
these provisions might conceivably be called into question by Freytag v. Commission-
er, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991), which upheld appointments of special trialjudges by the
Chief'Judge of the United States Tax Court on the ground that the Tax Court is a
"Court of Law" in which Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers. Id.
at 2641, 2645. Justice Scalia's concurrence for four justices, however, arguing that
"legislative courts" are most accurately deemed executive departments for constitu-
tional purposes, id. at 2657-60, would clearly support the President's authority to
remove adjudicators for misconduct.
38 Raoul Berger argues this is the exclusive conception ofjudicial independence
embodied in the Constitution, stating: "[A]ll the remarks in the several Conventions
that bear on judicial independence, so far as I could find, referred to freedom from
legislative and executive encroachments." BERGER, supra note 4, at 154. Even if this
is so, however, the intended beneficiaries of this freedom from encroachment include
not only the judges who remain free to govern themselves, but the parties who appear
before them and are assured relatively neutral and impartial adjudication. See Paul
R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 301, 322 (1989).
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judges-would be fundamentally inconsistent with whatever degree of
judicial freedom from extraneous influence that the Constitution
envisions.39 At the very least, it would be troubling in adjudication
involving the federal government that the judges would be dependent
on one of the litigants for their continued reputation and well-being.
Separation of powers theory, however, provides the more decisive
argument for the flat impermissibility of political mechanisms for
judicial discipline other than impeachment. The founders intended the
federal separation of powers specifically to preclude any possibility of
adjudication by Congress except in cases of impeachment:
One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation was
the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures. The
Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the
determination of the rights of one person to the "tyranny of
shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that members of the
General Assembly in his native Virginia had not been prevented
from assuming judicial power, and "'[t]hey have accordingly in
many instances decided rights which should have been left tojudiciay
controversy.'" The same concern also was evident in the reports of
the Council of the Censors, a body that was charged with deter-
mining whether the Pennsylvania Legislature had complied with
the State Constitution. The Council found that during this period
"[t]he constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers
assumed, which had not been delegated by the Constitution....
[C]ases belonging to the judiciary department, frequently [had
been] drawn within legislative cognizance and determination."
It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the
Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in
separate branches. Their concern that a legislature should not be
able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person
was expressed not only in this general allocation of power, but also
in more specific provisions, such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3.... This Clause, and the separation-of-powers
doctrine generally, reflect the Framers' concern that trial by a
legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of
power.
40
If adjudication by Congress is ordinarily impermissible as a general
matter, adjudicating the conduct of judges (except through the
39 On the exaggerated nature of the claim for maximum judicial independence at
the lower court level, see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
40 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961-62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (citations
omitted); see WOOD, supra note 20, at 407-08.
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specifically authorized mechanism of impeachment) would seem a
fortiori unacceptable. It would inflict on judges a specific mode of
usurpation actually discussed and recognized at the founding as a
categorical transgression of the separation of powers. Further, because
Congress's target would be a judge, there could be impermissible
legislative interference with the judiciary's exercise of even those
powers Congress had not directly usurped.
In a similar vein, the exercise of direct influence over the judiciary
by the Executive, except through the expressly conferred power of
appointment, would categorically violate the founders' expectations.
Although it was chiefly the Confederation period that alerted the
founders to the dangers of legislative influence over the judiciary,
41
the dangers of executive domination were recognized and addressed
even in the early Revolutionary constitutions.4 2  Until the mid-
eighteenth century, what are now considered executive and judicial
functions had usually been categorized together as "executive power."
This was so even though the separation of the King from the personal
exercise ofjudicial authority had become established British constitu-
tional doctrine. 43 The separation of executive and judicial powers in
the Revolutionary constitutions, and finally, in the United States
Constitution, thus reflected the later thought of Montesquieu, who not
only distinguished the three modes of power, but expressed in the most
emphatic terms the importance of separating executive and judicial
authorities: "Were [the judiciary power]joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression."44 The obvious
potential for subjugation of the judiciary that would result from placing
disciplinary power over judges in the hands of the Executive alone
would manifest an abuse about which the founders were self-conscious-
ly and explicitly concerned. Any proposal for such a disciplinary
measure should therefore be regarded as a per se violation of the
separation of powers.
41 See WOOD, supra note 20, at 161, 436, 452.
42 See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
43 See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 101-02 (1965).
44 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Thomas Nugent
trans., 1949).
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II. WHAT THE FOUNDERS LEFT OPEN: JUDICIARY-DEPENDENT
MECHANISMS FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
A number of commentators assert that the arguments demonstrat-
ing the exclusivity of impeachment as a political device for judicial
discipline exclude any possibility ofjudicial discipline throughjudiciary-
dependent devices such as prosecution or judicial self-regulation.
Three factors supposedly mandate that conclusion: (1) the Constitu-
tion's failure to authorize expressly any disciplinary procedure other
than removal, (2) the ideal of judicial independence embodied in
Article III, and (3) the contemporary statements such as the above-
quoted passages from The Federalist and the Letters of Brutus regarding
the exclusivity of impeachment as a removal device.45 If followed
categorically, this analysis would leave the government no procedural
avenue other than impeachment for disciplining sitting judges guilty of
misconduct, and no disciplinary sanctions other than removal and
disqualification for punishing such judges.
46
In response, however, other scholars have contended that
originalist evidence actually supports the availability of criminal
prosecution and judicial self-regulation as alternatives to impeach-
ment.47 These conclusions are often buttressed by the argument that
forms of discipline that depend on the judiciary for their effectuation
do not threaten the separation of powers.
48
45 See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON FED. LEGISLATION, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF N.Y., THE REMOVAL OF FEDERALJUDGES OTHER THAN BY IMPEACHMENT 9-21
(1977) (attacking the proposed Judicial Tenure Act on constitutional grounds);
MERRILL E. OTIS, A PROPOSED TRIBUNAL: IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL? 25-45 (1939)
(arguing that the letter and intent of the Impeachment Clauses exclude methods by
which authorities other than Congress may remove civil officers); Gerhardt, supra
note 9, at 73-77 (attacking constitutionality of permitting the federal judiciary to
investigate and discipline its own members under the Judicial Councils Reform and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1982).
'6 The Constitution unambiguously permits criminal process to be brought against
public officials after impeachment and removal. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 7. For
a discussion of whether the government might initiate legal proceedings against
corrupt judges prior to impeachment, see infra part II.A.
47 See e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 141-53,173-80 (arguing that the First Congress
provided for permanent disqualification for judges upon conviction for bribery);
Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 77-82 (supporting pre-impeachment prosecutions of
impeachable officials); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointmen Supervision, and
Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REv. 870, 891-98 (1930)
(arguing for judicial self-discipline and removal power).48 See e.g., BERGER, supra note 4, at 134-35, 174 (arguing that Congress's
authorization forjudicial self-regulation would not extend the power of the legislature
over individual judges); Shartel, supra note 47, at 893-94 (arguing that the ideal of the
separation of powers is consistent with judicial self-discipline).
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Originalist evidence cannot resolve this debate in the same
conclusive way it demonstrates the exclusivity of impeachment as a
political mechanism of judicial discipline. The scant contemporary
commentary on the prosecution of impeachable officials, for example,
is ambiguous as to whether the founders intended to bar criminal
prosecution prior to impeachment. 49 Judicial independence, more-
over, though an important "original" ideal, must compete with the
equally compelling "original" ideal of judicial integrity. In arguing in
favor ofjudicial self-regulatory power, one can indicate that the writ of
scire facias was available at common law as a judicial medium for
removing judges or other court officers for misbehavior. 50 No one
has unearthed any 1789 discussion of that writ, however, that would
confirm the existence of a contemporaneous understanding of its
inclusion within the "judicial power" conferred by Article 111.51 Thus,
although the Constitution may settle some relevant points on these
issues, determining the permissibility ofjudiciary-dependent modes of
judicial discipline must rely upon reasonable inferences.
49 In at least two passages in The Federalist, Hamilton states that, following
impeachment, an offender will be liable for criminal prosecution and punishment.
His point is unclear, however, in that it may suggest that prosecution prior to
impeachment would be improper, or instead, it may be meant merely to emphasize
that impeachment and removal do not exhaust the available tools of accountability
available for disciplining government officers who are guilty of misconduct. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398-99 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that the Supreme Court would be an improper forum for impeachment
because of judicial involvement in any subsequent criminal prosecution of the
impeached official); id. No. 77, at 463-64 (cataloguing the "requisites to safety, in the
republican sense," imposed to ensure presidential accountability to the people).
With respect to the beliefs of the early Congresses, it may be relevant that in
1795 the House chose not to impeachJudge George Turner based on the Attorney
General's assurance that he could be prosecuted in the courts for his alleged
misconduct. See Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment
as the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1209, 1217
n.43 (1991).
50 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 127-35 (providing examples from English history
of using scire facias to remove judges); Shartel, supra note 47, at 882-83 (arguing that
the availability ofjudicial proceedings for the forfeiture of office under the English
Constitution circumvents the bar imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers to
the extent that such proceedings apply to judges).
" Such conversation is unlikely ever to be unearthed if, as Martha Andes Ziskind
argues, scire facias was, by 1787, not a "precedent," but a "fossil." Ziskind, supra note
4, at 138.
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A. Pre-Impeachment Criminal Prosecution
The Constitution does not indicate whether pre-impeachment
criminal prosecutions are permissible. The textual argument against
such prosecutions springs from the following provision:
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States: but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment,
tria4 judgment and punishment, according to law.
52
The specific reference to the criminal liability of a "party convicted"
could be read to imply that the "cases of impeachment" to which the
prior clause refers must precede prosecution. On its face, of course, the
provision would not be limited to judges, but would treat prosecutions
of sitting judges and of sitting executive officials identically.
This interpretation of Article I, however, has odd operational
implications. The acquittal of an impeached judge would preclude
criminal prosecution even if the relevant facts would support a criminal
conviction. 53 Even more strangely, judges would be immunized from
prosecution altogether for any offense-no matter how serious-not
deemed by the House to constitute "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors."
54
These results might be plausible if we were confident that the
founders regarded the criminal law and impeachment as serving
identical purposes. If that were so, then a congressional determination
in a particular case not to impeach and convict an official would
necessarily vindicate the same values or aims that the founders
associated with the criminal law. The founders, however, did not
regard impeachment and the criminal law as serving the same ends.
They would not likely have wished to immunize from judicial process
those officials whose prosecution would serve purposes of the criminal
law, even if those officials were not liable to impeachment.
This conclusion is clearest if we begin with a comparison of the
United States Constitution with the antecedent British law. Under
British practice, criminal sanctions as well as removal were often a
consequence of impeachment. 55 Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 notably
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
53 See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal
of FederalJudges, 76 KY. L.J. 643, 668 (1988) ("If a federal judge must be 'convicted'
and thus removed before he or she can be prosecuted, a judge who has been
impeached but who is not, for whatever reason, convicted cannot be prosecuted.").
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
55 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 67 ("Although English impeachments did not
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prohibits that practice by authorizing only removal and disqualification
as consequences of impeachment. 56 The clear function of the first
half of Clause 7 is to signal a departure from the British model. The
second half of the clause indicates that the exclusion of criminal
sanctions from the impeachment process separates impeachment from
criminal law, without altogether rendering impeachable-or indeed,
impeached-officials immune from criminal prosecution. This
interpretation, under which Clause 7 indicates merely the limits of our
Constitution's departure from English precedent, is more plausible
than interpreting the Constitution to mean that sitting officials may
not, under any circumstances, be criminally tried.
Hamilton implicitly confirmed the difference between the aims of
criminal law and impeachment by writing:
[Impeachable offenses] proceed... from the abuse or violation of
some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to
injuries done immediately to the society itself.
5 7
The category of offenses that represent an "abuse or violation of some
public trust" was thought to differ from those behaviors that represent
criminal offenses;58 that is, Congress might regard certain common
crimes as lacking sufficient implications for an official's public
performance to warrant impeachment. Moreover, as indicated by
numerous historical precedents, impeachable abuses of the public trust
need not amount to criminal offenses themselves.59 The purpose of
impeachment, therefore, must be understood as the vindication of the
public trust. This purpose is distinct from, even when it coincides with,
require an indictable crime they were nonetheless criminal proceedings because
conviction was punishable by death, imprisonment, or heavy fine.").
56 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
57 THE FEDERALST No. 65, supra note 49, at 396; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITrION OF THE UNITED STATES § 803, at 586 (1905)
("[I]mpeachment is a proceeding purely of a political nature. It is not so much
designed to punish an offender as to secure the state against gross official misde-
meanors.").
58 The Philadelphia debates are summarized in HOFFER & HULL, supra note 22,
at 101-02. See also STAFF OF THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY, HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT 22-25 (Comm. Print 1974) (concluding that grounds for impeachment
should not be limited to crimes).
59 The pre-Nixon precedents are reviewed in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF
LEGAL COUNSEL, THE LAW OF IMPEACHMENT, APP. I: THE CONCEPT OF IMPEACHABLE
OFFENSE 32-57 (1974).
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those public purposes ordinarily associated with the criminal law: the
punishment of offenders and the deterrence of crime.
60
Given the intentional -distinction between the criminal and
impeachment processes, the founders probably did not intend
impeachment and conviction to be prerequisites to criminal prosecu-
tion. Indeed, limiting the grounds for impeachment to "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Grimes and Misdemeanors" seems to indicate
the drafters' expectation that the ordinary processes of criminal law
would adequately address the commission of common crimes unrelated
to the "public weal."
61
Two oft-heard originalist arguments bearing on the permissibility
of pre-impeachment criminal prosecutions of sitting judges are
particularly weak. Some opponents of pre-impeachment criminal
prosecutions argue that, if impeachment is the sole constitutional
mechanism for "removal" of sitting judges, then sanctions tantamount
to removal such as incarceration cannot be imposed.62 This argu-
ment, however, is a non sequitur. It assumes that the drafters
understood "removal" in a functionalist sense. As Professor Stephen
Burbank has observed, however, the specific conventional meaning in
1789 of the term "removal" was limited to the formal termination of
one's tenure in office, and contemporary references strongly suggest
that the founders did not functionally equate criminal liability with
removal. 63  The Supreme Court, therefore, would probably not
60 The House of Representatives relied on the distinction between the criminal
and impeachment processes in concluding that the criminal acquittal of Judge
Hastings on charges closely related to those made in his articles of impeachment did
not impose any "double jeopardy" restriction on the House. See U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN LOCAL JAILS:
FROM LAW ASSISTANCE TO LAw Surrs, S. DOC. No. 4, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 130, 134
(1989). The House position was upheld in Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp.
490, 500 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated and remanded, 1998 WL 81273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar.
2, 1993), dismissed, 1993 WL 439810, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993).
61 See HOFFER, supra note 22, at 101-02.
62 See Robert S. Catz, Removal of FederalJudges By Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS L.J.
103, 116-18 (1986); see also Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessa y and Improper. The
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J.
1117, 1131-32 (1985) (arguing that congressional authorization of"de facto removal
of Article lIjudges by their colleagues" by theJudicial Councils Reform andJudicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 was unconstitutional).
63 See Burbank, supra note 53, at 671-72 & n.130. In support of his argument,
Professor Burbank cites the following- THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 20 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Edward G. Bourne ed., 1901); id. (No. 77) at 97; id. (No. 79) at 108-09;
WILLIAM RAwLE, A VIEw OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
207 (1825) ("[Courts of law] can neither remove nor disqualify the person convicted,
and therefore the obnoxious officer might be continued in power and the injury
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interpret the word functionally.
64
A similarly narrow originalist argument, but offered to sustain the
permissibility of pre-impeachment prosecutions, rests on Chapter 9,
Section 21 of the Act of April 30, 1790,65 which provides that any
judge convicted of bribery shall be disqualified from holding federal
office of "honour, trust or profit."66 Professor Michael Gerhardt, for
example, has argued that the Act manifests the First Congress's
understanding that a consequence ordinarily linked with impeach-
ment-namely, disqualification from office-could be legitimately
imposed through the criminal process, thus proving that impeachment
is not "the sole means of removing federal judges."
67
This argument, though plausible, is inconclusive-the Act was never
enforced.68 Moreover, the statute is sufficiently ambiguous that, had
it been enforced, it could easily have lent itself to a narrowing
construction. Such a construction would have avoided constitutional
doubts regarding the general removability of sitting judges by means
other than impeachment. For example, had the Act been enforced, it
might have been upheld on the very limited ground that, because
bribery is constitutionally specified as an impeachable offense,
Congress might categorically decide that bribery always justifies
removal. This conclusion would have no bearing, however, on the
permissibility of statutory removal for any other crime besides treason,
sustained by the nation be renewed or increased .... "); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64-69 (Max Farrand rev. ed., 1966); id. at 208 ("A
commission granted during good behavior can only be revoked by this mode of
proceeding."); 2JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 782, at 251 (1833) ("In England, the judgment upon impeachments is not
confined to mere removal from office; but extends to the whole punishment attached
by law to the offence."); id. § 784 ("In the ordinary course of the administration of
criminal justice, no court is authorized to remove, or disqualify an offender, as a part
of its regular judgment. If it results at all, it results as a consequence, and not as a
part of the sentence."); 1 THE WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 325-26 (Robert G. McCloskey
ed., 1967).
64 The Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to read constitutional
powers provisions "literally," not functionally, when it is confident of their
conventional meaning. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1982). In the same
vein, one court of appeals has held that ajudge may be subjected to civil fines even
though the government's imposition of a fine could be construed as the functional
equivalent of an impermissible reduction of salary. See Duplantier v. United States,
606 F.2d 654, 669 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that penalties on judges for failing to file
financial disclosure statements do not violate Compensation Clause).
65 1 Stat. 112, 117 (1845).
66
id.
67 Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 29.
68 Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 108, 118 n.43 (1970).
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the one other ground for impeachment specifically mentioned in the
Constitution.
69
A more generalized originalist argument against pre-impeachment
prosecutions rests on the assertion that potential prosecution would
69 Another narrowing construction might begin with the observation that
"disqualification" and "removal" are different penalties; one logically need not entail
the other. The Senate votes to disqualify by means of a vote that is separate from the
vote to convict and remove. See PROCEDURE AND GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 95.
Given this distinction, the Act might have been treated merely as authorizing the
disqualification from office of a judge convicted of bribery in a post-impeachment
criminal proceeding, even if the prior impeachment of that judge resulted only in
removal, and not disqualification. Courts might ground such a narrowing construc-
tion on an imputed rationale that proof at trial of bribery beyond a reasonable doubt
should always incur disqualification, even if impeachment and conviction subject to
a lesser standard of proof had not. The Senate has never collectively decided to
mandate a uniform standard of proof in impeachment proceedings. See Stanley N.
Futterman, The Rules of Impeachment, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 136 (1975). The
conventionally understood implication of this fact is that each individual senator
remains free to judge the evidence under whatever standard, including a mere
preponderance of the evidence, that the senator deems appropriate. See id. This
understanding was confirmed by the Senate's express rejection, in 1986, of Judge
Claiborne's motion to adopt a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof for his
impeachment trial. See ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. RES. No.
156, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989). For an argument that the Senate should adopt
a uniform standard requiring "clear and convincing" evidence, see Ronald D.
Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J.
707, 719-20 (1988) (asserting that "clear and convincing evidence" is a "high" standard
of proof used in important noncriminal cases). Thus limited, the Act would not be
probative as to the permissible timing of criminal prosecution.
Lest my hypothetical narrowing constructions appear implausibly creative,
compare Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906). Burton held that the
disqualification penalty imposed by an anti-bribery statute covering any "Senator,
Representative, or Delegate" and any "head of a Department, or other officer or clerk
in the employ of the Government" did not remove a convicted senator from office:
LT]he declaration in section 1782, that any one convicted under its
provisions shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust or profit
"under the Government of the United States" refers only to officers created
by or existing under the direct authority of the National Government as
organized under the Constitution, and not to offices the appointments to
which are made by the States, acting separately, albeit proceeding, in respect
of such appointments, under the sanction of that instrument. While the
Senate, as a branch of the Legislative Department, owes its existence to the
Constitution, and participates in passing laws that concern the entire
country, its members are chosen by state legislatures, and cannot properly
be said to hold their places "under the Government of the United States."
Id. at 359, 369-70. Even prior to the 17th Amendment, this was fairly tortured
reasoning. For a more extensive treatment of the issues raised by the Act of April 30,
1790 and by Burton, see ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONGREsSIONAL RESEARCH SERV.,
DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERALJUDGES CONVICTED OF BRIBERY-AN EXAMINATION OF
THE ACT OF APRIL 30, 1790 AND RELATED ISSUES (1992).
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subject sitting judges to a level of intimidation that violates judicial
independence. The rigors and expense of a criminal investigation are
allegedly so great as to offer the Executive real leverage over judges,
even if those judges are exonerated.
70
This argument is far from frivolous because there is no doubt that
the vulnerability of sitting judges to criminal prosecution does
potentially compromise the ideal of judicial independence-notably,
that aspect of independence that depends on freedom from subjuga-
tion to either of the political branches. The Executive's capacity to
pressure judges through criminal investigations is obvious; history
demonstrates the potential abuse of prosecutorial power to retaliate
against individuals whom the Executive finds hostile to its policies.
7 1
Given ordinary human psychology, it presumably requires significant
institutional self-discipline to resist the temptation to investigate judges
who frustrate the Executive through their solicitude for criminal
defendants' rights.
Arguing from the independence ideal is not conclusive, however,
because judicial independence is not the only constitutional value
relevant to judicial performance. If it is fair in argument to move from
precise textual details regarding judicial tenure to the founders' more
general allegiance to judicial independence, then it is equally legitimate
to move beyond those details to stress a competing ideal-namely the
founders' desire for judicial integrity. Each federal court that was
recently asked to consider the amenability of sitting judges to pre-
impeachment criminal prosecution has found such prosecution
permissible. In each case, the court deemed the inappropriateness of
placing sitting judges "above the law" to be the paramount relevant
value. 72 It would seem impossible to prove empirically that these
70 See supra note 62.
71 See generally NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-1990 (1992) (focusing on the activities of
Attorney Generals Palmer, Daugherty, and Mitchell);JoHN T. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960'S (1971)
(examining the Justice Department's actions with respect to 1960s movements such
as Black militancy and antiwar dissent); EDWIN P. HOYT, THE PALMER RAIDS, 1919-
1920: AN ATrEMPT TO SUPPRESS DISSENT (1969) (chronicling the anticommunist
"Palmer Raids" of the early twentieth century).
72 See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir.) (holding that
Article III protections should not be expanded to insulate federaljudges from their
criminal wrongdoing), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); United States v. Hastings, 681
F.2d 706, 710-11 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that ajudge is subject to the processes of
the criminal law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); see also United States v. Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir.) (stating that the tenure provision in Article III is not
a license to commit crime), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 476 (1974); ef. United States v.
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courts are wrong-that judicial vulnerability to criminal prosecution
prior to impeachment necessarily does more to compromise judicial
independence than immunity would do to undermine legal accountabil-
ity.
73
Also noteworthy is that Congress has the power to mitigate the
separation of powers risk posed by the criminal prosecution ofjudges.
Congress may design a procedure under which prosecutorial decision-
making regarding sitting judges is vested largely in judicially appointed
special prosecutors beyond the policy control of the President. The
Supreme Court has already upheld the judicial appointment of
Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1395-96 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a separation of powers
argument for a higher standard of reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to targeting
judges for federal criminal investigations), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
At a December 18, 1992 "Constitutional Roundtable," sponsored by the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal to discuss an earlier draft of this
Article, Professor Amar offered an alternative route to the argument made above.
Professor Amar interprets the Constitution as implying "that generally all federal
officials are subject to the general criminal laws passed by Congress." Akhil R. Amar,
On judicial Impeachment and Its Alternatives-Remarks Prepared For the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 3 (Dec. 18, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). He argues that because all federal officials could
thus be made subject to a federal statute imposing capital punishment for certain
federal crimes, such as murder in the District of Columbia, removal from office
should be regarded as simply one of the wide range of lesser penalties embraced by
Congress's near-plenary power to prescribe sanctions for federal offenses. See id. at
1, 5. By vesting the pardoning power in the President, Amar argues, the Constitution
implies his sole exemption from this liability: "How could the [sitting] President be
prosecuted criminally if he retains the power to pardon himself?" Id. at 3-4 & n.4.
I am not entirely comfortable with this analysis for three reasons. First, it is not
as clear to me, as it is to Professor Amar, that the President could legally pardon
himself. The possible implication of the remainder of Professor Amar's reasoning,
that the President could be removed and disqualified by criminal prosecution alone,
appears to me to be a strong argument against that reasoning. Second, as Professor
Dellinger pointed out during the Commission hearing, even if the President is
exempt, the Vice-President would not be. This is also a highly surprising conclusion.
Third, even if one concludes, as I do, that the value of applying the rule of law to
judges outweighs the value ofjudicial independence in this context, I believe the best
method for reaching this conclusion, and for interpreting the Constitution generally
on questions ofjudicial discipline, is one that at least attends to the competing values
explicitly, even if the result is a form of "balancing" that is admittedly contestable.
73 For the same reasons, there seems to be no doubt about the vulnerability of
sitting federal judges to civil penalties for misconduct. See Duplantier v. United
States, 606 F.2d 654, 667-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding provisions pertaining to
judges in Ethics in Government Act of 1978, including civil penalties for failing to file
required financial disclosure statements).
For an even more detailed review of relevant cases that reached the conclusion
that sittingjudges are constitutionally susceptible to criminal prosecution, see Todd
D. Peterson, The Role of the Executive Branch in the Discipline and Removal of
Judges 41-89 (Mar. 19, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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independent counsel against a separation of powers attack in Morrison
v. Olson.74 Specifically, the Court rejected contentions that depriving
the President of plenary policy control over the decision-making of
certain criminal prosecutors disabled him from discharging his
constitutional functions. 75 Permitting the judiciary to select prosecu-
tors in cases involving judges and removing those prosecutors from
routine policy oversight by the Executive could significantly reduce any
risk of subjugating the judiciary to executive domination.
B. Judicial Self-Regulation
Besides criminal prosecution, the most obvious alternatives to
political mechanisms of judicial discipline involve judicial self-regula-
tion. Congress adopted this approach in enacting the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.76 Under
that act, any person alleging that a federal judge other than a Supreme
Court justice "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts" may file a
complaint with the clerk of the court of appeals for the relevant
circuit. 77 The clerk then forwards any such complaint ordinarily to
the chief judge of the circuit, as well as to the target of the com-
plaint.78  The chief judge has discretion, on various grounds, to
dismiss the complaint or to convene a committee of judges to
investigate its allegations.79 That committee is required, in turn, to
74 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
75 See id. at 695-96. Morrison has generated enormous commentary, indicating
disagreement not only about the Court's results, but about what the Court actually
decided as well. Professor Gerhardt, for example, has explained the holding in
Morrison as reflectinga balancing test to determine whether the Ethics in Government
Act usurped executive power. See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 56. I, however, have
suggested that the holding is best understood as a categorical determination that the
"executive power" conferred byArticle III does not necessarily include policy control
over criminal prosecution. See Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and
Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 598-608
(1989); see also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the
Federal Courts, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 474,484-94 (1989) (suggesting Morrison held
that criminal prosecutions are not a solely executive function); Stephanie A.J. Dangel,
Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers'
Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990) (same).
76 Pub. L. No. 96-458, § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036-40 (1980 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 372 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
77 § 372(c)(1) (1988).
78 See id. § 372(c)(2). Complaints against the chiefjudge go to the circuit judge
in regular service next senior to the chiefjudge in date of commission. See id.
71 See id. § 372(c)(3)(A), (4)(A).
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file a report with the judicial council of the circuit.8 0 Upon consider-
ation, the council may investigate further; exercise any of a number of
disciplinary powers, including the direction that, "on a temporary basis
for a time certain," no cases be assigned to ajudge; or censure ajudge,
privately or publicly.8 ' The Council's alternatives include referring
a complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States.8 2 If a
council concludes that ajudge serving during good behavior may have
engaged in conduct potentially entailing impeachment, it must certify
its determination to the Judicial Conference.83 No judicial council,
however, may remove a judge appointed to hold office during good
behavior.
8 4
TheJudicial Conference, upon receiving a complaint from ajudicial
council, may exercise any of the same powers vested in the council to
dispose of a complaint.8 5 If it determines that impeachment may be
warranted, the Conference must transmit its determination and a
record of the proceedings to the House of Representatives.8 6 The
Conference is further empowered to make such a finding, without
formal complaint or certification, if a judge or magistrate has been
convicted of a felony and no procedural prospect remains for
overturning the conviction.
8 7
Such legislation raises several major questions. First, may Congress
authorize Article III judges to discipline other Article Ill judges?
Second, may such discipline extend to the Supreme Court? And third,
would removal be a permissible consequence of any such discipline?
As noted above, a number of scholars have sought to deploy
specifically focused "textualist" and "originalist" arguments to resolve
these issues. Arguments in opposition to judicial self-regulation state
that the Constitution nowhere expressly authorizes it,88 and, in favor,
that the Constitution nowhere expressly forbids it.8 9 In favor of
judicial self-regulation it is argued that the standard for judicial tenure
("during good Behaviour") is distinct from and facially broader than
the description of conduct that may entail impeachment;9° opponents
80 See id. § 372(c)(5).
81 Id. § 372(c)(6).
82 See id. § 372(c)(7)(A).
8" See id. § 372(c)(7)(B).
84 See id. § 372(c)(6)(B)(vil)(I).
85 See id. § 3 72(c)(8).
86 See id.
87 See id. § 372(c)(8)(B).
88 See OTis, supra note 45, at 24-26.
89 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 136-37.
90 See id. at 137-41, 177-80.
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insist that the Article III standard is but a term of art signifying life
tenure, terminable only through impeachment. 91 A similar contest is
posed by statements of various contemporaries of the founders
indicating that impeachment is the sole means of effectuating judicial
removal.9 2 The response is that the founders were referring only to
political mechanisms of discipline when they discussed the exclusivity
of impeachment. 9 In any event, the exclusivity of impeachment for
removal purposes would not logically foreclose other disciplinary
sanctions short of removal, which might be effectuated through other
means.
If the durability of these competing and neatly opposed arguments
testifies to the futility of adjudicating persuasively between them, the
situation is not much advanced by considering historical practice
known to the founders regarding judicial self-discipline. Burke Shartel
and Raoul Berger have both argued that the Constitution did not bar
judicial removal ofjudges through the common law writ of scire facias.
As explained by Shartel:
[T]he English Constitution knew certain judicial proceedings for
the forfeiture of office. Judges and other officers, holding "during
good behavior" by patent from the King, were removable on scire
facias in the King's Bench.... The causes of forfeiture were...
misconduct and neglect of duty; and the judgment of ouster,
essential to complete the forfeiture, was not different in substance
and effect from a judgment of removal.
94
As argued by Shartel and Berger,95 the failure of the Constitution to
bar such judicial proceedings and their facial consistency with
separation of powers theory support a conclusion that the founders did
not intend to bar recourse to judicial self-disciplinary proceedings.
In her 1969 study, however, Martha Andes Ziskind found the scire
facias history unpersuasive.9 6 First, the specific removals cited by
Shartel involved English court officials, but not judges.9 7 Second,
there is no evidence that scire facias was within the framers' contempla-
91 See Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and
Mandatory Retirement Proceduresfor the FederalJudiiary: The Meaning of "During Good
Behaviour," 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 459-60 (1967).
92 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
93 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 152-53.
' Shartel, supra note 47, at 882-83 (footnotes omitted).
95 See BERGER, supra note 4, at 127-35; Shartel, supra note 47, at 883.
96 See Ziskind, supra note 4, at 137-38.
17 See id. at 138.
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ion: no state constitution had expressly authorized the writ.
98
Third, no mention of the writ appears in notes of the Philadelphia
Convention.9 9 And finally, Blackstone, the source of English law best
known to Americans, did not even mention scire facias as a mechanism
for judicial removal.1 00
In response, Berger offers plausible explanations why state
constitutions would not mention scire facias and why the framers
would not have discussed it.10 1 But these explanations do not
themselves constitute affirmative evidence of original intent. Indeed,
Berger does not contend that his reasoning amounts to evidence that
the founders consciously resolved to authorize judicial self-regulation
concerning misconduct. His test for the "intention of the Framers" is
whether the framers would likely have rejected scire facias had they
thought about it.10 2 And, on this question, Berger relies less on the
founders' supposed acquaintance with scire facias than on arguments
for reading "good Behaviour" as a broader standard for discipline than
"Treason, Bribery, or high Crimes or Misdemeanors."10 3  This
strategy only confirms the larger impression formed by reading Shartel,
Ziskind, and Berger together, namely, that scire facias offers the
thinnest of reeds on which to build any interpretation of the founders'
intent. On this point, it makes sense to look beyond narrowly focused
snippets of impeachment-related history and debate in order to form
a sensible reading of the Constitution as a whole.
The argument most strenuously deployed against judicial self-
regulation concerns the conflict judicial self-regulation portends with
the value of judicial independence embodied in Article 111.104 Even
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 BERGER, supra note 4, at 141-47 (stating that scire facias was unnecessary
because judicial appointments were terminable at the King's will).
102 Although he describes his search as one for "the intention of the Framers," id.
at 141, Berger later states that the proper test of constitutional interpretation "is that
of ChiefJustice Marshall, who required a showing that had 'this particular case' been
suggested-for present purposes, removal by scire fadias to effectuate 'good
behavior'-the Framers would have rejected it." Id. at 146.
10$ See id. at 125-26, 147-53.
104 See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 136-41 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that judicial self-regulation was employed by judges in an
effort to achieve their brand of uniformity); id. at 141-43 (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that judicial self-regulation had been used by judges to harass); Hastings v.
Judicial Conference, 770 F.2d 1093, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J., concurring)
(suggesting that judicial self-regulation might be used to pressure or intimidate a
"non-conformist" judge), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); Battisti, supra note 20, at
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if self-regulation fails to pose the interbranch conflicts that doom
political mechanisms for discipline other than impeachment, the
prospect of judges overseeing one another outside of the ordinary
processes of appellate review arguably poses the identical risk of
compromising an individual judge's impartiality and open-minded-
ness.
105
The argument for maximum judicial independence is fairly
compelling at the Supreme Court level. It is the one federal court that
the Constitution explicitly mandates, and its core responsibilities-
assuring the states' compliance with the federal law and checking the
exercise of power by the elected federal branches-require the utmost
steadfastness and institutional self-confidence. Giving lower court
judges disciplinary power over the justices would be facially inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's role, 10 6 while permitting Supreme
Court justices to discipline one another could so easily destabilize the
Court as to pose an intolerable risk to the Court's legitimacy.1
0 7
The argument is far less compelling, however, at the lower court
level. The problem is not that judicial independence becomes
insignificant at the lower court level, but that the founders clearly did
not protect that value to the same extent for trial and intermediate
appellate judges as they did for Supreme Court justices. Instead of
directly providing for lower courts, the Constitution authorizes
723-24 (arguing thatjudicial self-regulation interferes with the independent decision-
making of individual judges); Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 76-77 (suggesting that
empoweringjudges to initiate complaints allows them to intimidate and harass other
judges); Baker, supra note 62, at 1142-43 (illustrating the potential for judicial self-
regulation to be used by litigants to harass a "judicial maverick").
105 See Chandler, 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hastings, 770 F.2d at
1107 (Edwards, J., concurring).
106 The Supreme Court has employed a standard of constitutional "incongruity"
to measure whether the vesting of a particular function in a specific organ of
government might be impermissible, even if not explicitly barred by the Constitution.
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675-77 (1988) (vesting the power in courts to
appoint special prosecutors not "incongruous"); Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,397-98
(1880) (requiring courts to appoint supervisors of election is within the power of
Congress). Although the incongruity standard is vague, it would seem to condemn
the notion thatjudges whose work is routinely reviewed by the Supreme Court might
be authorized to discipline the justices reviewing them. The drafters of the Judicial
Councils Reform and judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 regarded such a
system as not merely incongruous, but dangerous. See H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 n.28 (1980).
7 Although the Court's divisions are less explicitly partisan than might have been
noted in an earlier day, the much-noted vitriol evident in several justices' recent
opinions sound a warning note of the risks that could attend permitting thejustices
to discipline one another.
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Congress to establish "inferior Tribunals."1 0 8 It is well established
that the discretion thus conferred authorizes Congress to determine
which, if any, lower federal courts are necessary, and what their
jurisdiction should be.10 9 More to the point, the Constitution autho-
rizes Congress to leave federal law substantially to state courts at the
lower court level.110 The adoption of this plan represented an
explicit rejection of the uncompromising program for federal judicial
independence advanced by the Federalists, including the mandatory
creation of inferior Article III courts.11 1 This casts doubt on the
reliability of the leading Federalists' subsequent claims concerning the
degree of independence that was actually guaranteed by the plan they
disfavored, but which nonetheless was adopted.
The constitutional plan for lower courts makes manifest that the
Constitution did not assure lower court litigants that their claims would
be initially resolved by judges whose independence was protected
against the influence of potential discipline by means other than
impeachment. In 1789, relegating federal claims to state courts meant
that, in some states, federal litigants were subject to judges elected or
appointed for terms,112 to judges removable by address from the
legislature, 113 and to judges removable through state judicial pro-
ceedings.114 The Supreme Court has never suggested that the
Constitution guarantees federal litigants lower court judges so
independent that the states are bound to provide the equivalent of
Article III protections to state judges authorized to determine federal
claims. For potential federal claimants in 1789-as for the host of
litigants in modern administrative agencies-the only constitutionally
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
109 See Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1030-33 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power to Control theJurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1975). But see Theodore Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498,
501-04 (1974).
110 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 1-2.
111 See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal CourtJurisdiction: A Guided
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article II, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 854 (1984).112 judges had definite terms of appointment in New Jersey (supreme court: seven
years; lower courts: five years), Pennsylvania (seven years) and Georgia (three years),
and were elected annually under the 1786 Vermont Constitution. See Ziskind, supra
note 4, at 138-47.
1' Removal upon address by the legislature was prescribed by early Constitutions
of Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. See id.
114 Judges could be removed through criminal conviction in Maryland and North
Carolina. See id. at 141-42.
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assured recourse to maximally independent judges existed at the
Supreme Court level.
This judicial structure belies any narrow argument suggesting that
there was a specific original intent to vest maximum individual
independence in all lower court judges, even at the cost of all
competing institutional values. A sounder position is that Congress
may vest judicial self-regulatory powers in the federal courts, at least to
the extent that the independence of lower federal judges is not
compromised to a greater extent than was the independence of state
judges in 1789. Congress is entitled to authorize judicial self-regulation
within the bounds of the general balancing test elaborated by the
Supreme Court for those separation of powers controversies the Court
cannot resolve on more categorical historical or textual grounds.
115
Under this doctrine, formulated in an analogous context in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,1 1 6 Congress may authorize a system
of judicial self-regulation if it does not threaten to undermine the
courts' ability to discharge their constitutional functions, or if any risk
posed to judicial power is outweighed by the appropriateness of
congressional action to safeguard some interest within Congress's
constitutional power to protect. Indeed, Congress's regulatory power
in this area simply parallels its acknowledged regulatory powers
regarding judicial structure, jurisdiction, administration, and proce-
dure.
n 7
115 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974) (upholding Congress's
power to arrange for the executive branch's management of presidential documents
through the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act).
116 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
117 See JOHNNY H. KILLIAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DIsABILrrY ACT OF 1979
(1979), reprinted in Judicial Tenure and Discipline-1979-80: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 697, 705-08 (1980). On the history of
congressional regulation of federal court administration, see PETER G. FISH, THE
POLrCS OF FEDERALJUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 228-68 (1973); MichaelJ. Remington,
Circuit Council Reform: A Boat Hook for Judges and Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 695, 707-12.
This Article has not considered the scope of self-regulatory power that might be
deemed vested directly in the federal courts by Article III's grant of "judicial power."
Although Article III could be read as conferring some degree of self-regulatory
power, just as it could be read to confer some degree of inherent jurisdiction, the
federal courts now chiefly proceed as if their structure and authority were dependent
on legislative authorization or, at least, subject to legislative regulation. Congress's
enactment and judicial implementation of the Judicial Councils Reform andJudicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 strongly suggests that Congress and the courts
will proceed under a legislative authorization model in designing any future systems
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The argument for the permissibility of judicial self-regulation still
faces the difficult question whether such a system could permit removal
as a sanction. The move from narrow originalism to a type of
functionalism in assessing judicial self-regulation was justified above, in
part, on the ground that the founders' discussions on the exclusivity of
impeachment did not occur in the context of any conscious consider-
ation of judicial self-regulation. The founders did, however, give
conscious consideration to the seriousness of removal as a disciplinary
mechanism for Article III judges. The Supreme Court might well
regard the constitutionally explicit singling out of removal and
disqualification as consequences of impeachment as setting categorical
limits to those sanctions that might be imposed through other
means. 11 8 Because doubts on this point are more serious than
doubts whetherjudicial self-discipline per se is permissible, Congress's
wisdom in excluding judicial removals of Article III judges from the
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980 is clear.
119
It remains advisable, however, to avoid a narrow originalist
determination of the general permissibility of judiciary-dependent
disciplinary mechanisms short of removal, especially if one considers
the profoundly different circumstances facing the federal judiciary in
1789 and 1993. Had the founders thought about judicial self-regula-
tion in 1789, they might have thought the following: With so few
federal judges scattered over so wide a territory, a system of mutual
self-policing would be not only unwise, but impracticable. In contrast,
it would have been easy for Congress to inform itself as to the
performance of the entire federal judiciary, and to police serious
instances of misconduct effectively.
Today, the federal judiciary comprises not nineteen judges, but
820.120 As the range of critical business competing for Congress's
ofjudicial self-regulation as well.
118 If, as Professor Gerhardt contends, the Act of 1790, authorizing automatic
disquaiffication from office for any federal judge convicted of bribery, implicitly
establishes the permissibility of removingjudges through criminal prosecution, then
the argument that removal is a sui generis sanction that may be imposed solely
through impeachment would be weaker. See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 81. This
author's doubts that the Act of 1790 can persuasively bear that much interpretive
weight are noted above. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. Moreover, if
Professor Amar is correct in suggesting that removal through criminal processes is
permissible because of considerations unique to criminal law, then the Act of 1790-
even under the Gerhardt interpretation-would not necessarily be probative as to the
permissibility of removal through civil processes. See supra note 72.
n9 See H.R. REP. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-19 (1980).
120 CompareJudiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (1789) (authorizing six seats on
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attention has grown greatly, the significance of the federal judiciary in
the life of the American polity has expanded beyond anything the most
prescient founder could have foreseen. Given the increased public
demands for official accountability, the greater judicial capacity-and
reduced legislative capacity-to perform a policing function, and the
increased complexity of quality control in a vastly larger judiciary,
subjected to a much broader range of ethical constraints, proposals for
judicial self-regulation surely enjoy an immediacy today that they would
not have possessed in 1789. To bar Congress from considering the
appeal of such mechanisms in 1993, due to speculation that the
founders might have rejected scire facias judicial removals in 1789,
would be perverse. The Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall said,
should be regarded as a document "intended to endure for ages to
come." 121 Congressional discretion to improve the regulation of the
federal judiciary is consistent with that principle.
So long as Supreme Court justices remain outside the purview of
the congressionally authorized system of judicial self-discipline, no
successful separation of powers challenge to the Judicial Councils
Reform andJudicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is likely. That
Act does not entail the supervision of the courts by either elected
branch of government. Both the substantive judgments authorized by
the Act, and the procedures for its enforcement, are to be implement-
ed by the judiciary. 22 Although the Act creates a risk that particular
chief judges and judicial councils might impermissibly use their
disciplinary powers to chill the decisional independence of individual
judges, the traditions and training of the federal judiciary, as well as
the institutional caution invariably exhibited in all systems of self-
regulation, suggest that the risk is not great. Congress's judgment is
certainly rational that so speculative a hazard is outweighed by the
contribution such a system can make to public confidence in the
judiciary.
123
the Supreme Court and 13 district judgeships) with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 (1988) (nine seats
on Supreme Court), 44(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing 179 court of appeals
judgeships) and 133(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (632 district court judgeships).
21 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
122 See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
12' Again reflecting his distaste for constitutional arguments that explicitly rely on
a balancing of competing institutional costs and benefits, Professor Amar has
suggested an alternative, and seemingly more categorical, analysis by which to reach
the same conclusions proffered above. The conclusions are: (1) judicial self-
regulation at lower court levels is constitutionally permissible; (2) judicial self-
regulation at the Supreme Court level is impermissible; and (3) no system ofjudicial
self-regulation may employ removal as a sanction. In short, his argument is that the
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CONCLUSION
The arguments asserting that impeachment is the sole constitution-
ally authorized mechanism forjudicial discipline are not frivolous. The
constitutional text could be so interpreted. Other writings from the
founders exist which, read for all they are worth, could point to that
conclusion. This originalist evidence, considered in combination with
other aspects of the separation of powers, indicates that impeachment
is the only permissible political mechanism of judicial discipline.
Neither Congress nor the President, unilaterally or in tandem, has any
other recourse to remove or discipline federal judges.
These arguments, however, are not persuasive regarding judiciary-
dependent mechanisms of judicial discipline. The evidence that all
federal judges are amenable to criminal prosecution at any time
suggests at least one disciplinary alternative to impeachment.
Moreover, the most sensible reading of the Constitution would not
preclude a system of judicial self-regulation which employs sanctions
short of removal for judges below the Supreme Court level. There is
no evidence that the Impeachment Clauses were crafted to eliminate
any known abuse of judicial self-regulatory powers. Nor does judicial
regulation ofjudicial conduct at lower court levels is part and parcel of the ordinary
powers of appellate control of lower court behavior-powers normally exercised, for
example, through writs of mandamus or prohibition. Disciplinary review of Supreme
Courtjustices and disciplinary removals at any level are impermissible because they
cannot be reconciled with the ordinary structure and operation of appellate review.
See Amar, supra note 72, at 6-9.
Despite the elegance of this approach, I prefer my own analysis for several
reasons. First, I am unpersuaded by Professor Amar's characterization ofjudicial
discipline pursuant to such schemes as the 1980 Act as essentially administrative, and
thus properly conceptualized as akin to mandamus review. The point of such
discipline is not merely to assure the proper resolution of particular legal disputes,
but to chasten judges and to deter misconduct-tasks not normally associated with
appellate review. Furthermore, if disciplinary measures under the 1980 Act are
merely "administrative," it is unclear why removal could not be viewed equally as
administrative. The founders' decision to divorce impeachment and removal from
the criminal law system reflects a conceptualization of removal as a remedy to protect
the proper functioning of government, rather than as a form of dishonor or
punishment. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. In the broadest sense,
removals are thus administrative.
Finally, I think Professor Amar's constitutional interpretation, while eschewing
balancing tests at a superficial level, actually disguises the balancing judgment that
underlies his analysis. His arguments that discipline is "like" mandamus, but that
removal is not"like" normal administration, depend on tacitjudgments whether the
assimilation of particular practices to the operation of the judiciary would be
consistent with the way the judiciary should operate or, rather, subversive of
constitutional values. These judgments entail precisely the sorts of intangible
considerations that my balancing approach makes explicit.
1993]
242 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:209
self-regulation pose dangers of overstepping by the other branches.
The risks posed to the decisional independence of individualjudges are
not so blatant as to invalidate self-regulation; Congress could reason-
ably accord more weight to the potential boost in public confidence in
the judiciary. Additionally, should any congressionally enacted rule or
procedure disrupt the judicial function to a degree that cannot be
justified by an overbalancing public interest within Congress's power
to protect, or should such a rule or procedure transgress any constitu-
tional rights that judges enjoy in common with all persons, 124 then
the judiciary may invalidate that rule or procedure. For this reason,
permitting Congress to authorizejudicial disciplinary procedures would
not pose a significant threat to judicial independence or the separation
of powers.
124 Because the range of hypothetical rules that Congress might impose is infinite,
I have not tried to enumerate all the ways in which particular disciplinary rules might
be subjected to constitutional challenge. Likely challenges, however, would probably
fall into two categories. First, certain rules might be challenged as unjustifiable
infringements of universally enjoyed civil rights and liberties. For example, however
pressing the importance of judicial impartiality, Congress presumably could not
sustain on that basis a disciplinary rule that barred judges from voting in partisan
candidate elections. Second, certain rules might be challenged-on their face or as
applied-because of their undue interference with judicial independence and
impartiality. For example, it would seem constitutionally dubious to discipline trial
judges for high rates of reversal on appeal.
